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I. INTRODUCTION
The migration of individuals and businesses as the result of high
taxes often concerns local governmental officials. Consequently, they
engage in programs designed to lower the tax costs of certain highly
mobile residents. Local governmental officials tailor these programs
to eliminate locational disincentives for current residents and, perhaps
more importantly, for potential individual and business residents.
Economists refer to this particular behavior on the part of local taxing
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officials as tax competition. 1
Tax competition involves competition among local taxing jurisdic-
tions over mobile residents as sources of tax revenue. This competi-
tion is similar in many respects to the competition among firms in the
private sector. The tax price an individual or business faces in relation
to the basket of public goods provided by local government can be lik-
ened to the market price of a product in relation to the quantity and/
or quality of the product provided by the market. If the individual or
business does not like the terms of their bargain, then they are free to
seek a better buy elsewhere. This freedom to contract lies at the heart
of competition. Although the freedom to contract exists to a much
greater extent in private markets, the freedom to move from one ju-
risdiction to another gives residents a quasi freedom of contract with
local government.2 Concerned that residents will exercise this free-
dom in search of a better buy for their tax dollar, local governmental
officials engage in tax competition to eliminate the locational disincen-
tives of their present fiscal systems.
The Nebraska Legislature recently provided an illustrative exam-
ple of tax competition in practice by reforming Nebraska's taxing
scheme.3 Forced by competitive pressures to eliminate the locational
disincentives of Nebraska's taxing scheme, the Nebraska Legislature
reduced the progressivity of the individual income tax, and offered tax
cuts favoring highly mobile business.
Nebraska is not alone in its attempts to improve its competitive
taxing posture. Similar behavior by taxing officials of states through-
out the nation has become commonplace. This recent increase in tax
competition raises two interesting questions. First, why the sudden
increase in tax competitive behavior? Are there factors promoting tax
competition today that were not present in the past? Second, what
are the consequences of this competitive behavior? Should it be
viewed with the same favor with which we view competition in the
marketplace, or are there hidden evils? Answers to these questions
have important policy implications for both federal and state govern-
ment. If the factors that lie behind the recent increase in tax competi-
tion are likely to persist, then it seems critically important that we
have a thorough understanding of the economic and social ramifica-
tions of this governmental behavior. The major purpose of this Com-
ment is to take a step forward in providing such an understanding.
This Comment begins, in Part II, with a cursory look at tax compe-
tition in the public sector. This part provides a theoretical develop-
ment of tax competition and examines the role tax competition plays
1. See, eg., W. OATES, FISCAL FEDERALISM 143 (1972).
2. As to this notion of a voluntary or social contract with local government, see J.
OcHs, PuBLIc FINANcE 115-19 (1974).
3. Part III of this Comment discusses the details of this reform.
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in the design of local fiscal systems. Moving from theory to practice,
Part III of this Comment examines how tax competition recently in-
fluenced tax reform in Nebraska, pressuring local officials to reduce
tax progressivity and to engage in tax discrimination against immobile
business. Part IV is the focal point of the Comment, analyzing in some
detail the economic ramifications of tax competition. This economic
analysis focuses primarily on issues of efficiency and equity. Finally,
Part V provides some concluding remarks and a plea for further un-
derstanding of the growing influence tax competition has on our local
public economies.
II. TAX COMPETITION
A. A Theory of Tax Competition
At the heart of modern price or microeconomic theory is the as-
sumption that the incentive to maximize utility4 motivates individual
economic behavior,5 while the incentive to maximize profits motivates
the economic behavior of the firm.6 The theoretical basis of competi-
tive behavior among firms in private markets follows logically as a
result of the behavioral interactions of these two market participants.7
Desiring to maximize utility, the individual seeks the best products his
money can buy. Cognizant of this behavior, firms produce those prod-
ucts that the consumer desires at the lowest possible price,8 in an ef-
fort to maximize profits by attracting customers from competing
firms. Since the days of Adam Smith, this competitive behavior
among firms in the marketplace has been a cherished feature of our
4. The British philosopher Jeremy Bentham first introduced the concept of utility.
Bentham described the concept of utility as follows:
Nature has placed mankind under the governance of two sovereign mas-
ters, pain and pleasure.... The principle of utility recognizes this sub-
jection.... By the principle of utility is meant that principle which
approves or disapproves of every action whatsoever, according to the ten-
dency which it appears to have to augment or diminish the happiness of
the party whose interest is in question.
J. HIRSHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND APPLICATIONS 61 (3d ed. 1984) (quoting J.
BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION
ch. 1 (1823)).
5. See, e.g., J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 4, at 61.
6. See, e.g., H. VARIAN, MICROECONOMIC ANALYSIS 6 (2d ed. 1984).
7. For example, in perfectly competitive markets, "[w]hen each firm sets the price
at which it sells its output, it will have to take into account not only the behavior
of the consumers, but also the behavior of other producers." Id. at 82.
8. In the long run, in perfectly competitive markets, prices would be driven down to
levels where the economic profit of the firm is zero. See, e.g., J. HIRsHLEIFER,
supra note 4, at 216. It is important to distinguish between economic profits and
accounting profits, as the former is revenue minus "all" costs, while the latter is
apt to exclude certain costs such as the cost of shareholder capital.
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market economy.9
In local public economies, the theoretical basis for competition
breaks down as local not-for-profit government replaces the profit-
maximizing firm. The profit and survival incentives that motivate pri-
vate firms to respond to consumers' desires do not exist in the public
sector. Yet, the fact that we do indeed witness tax competitive behav-
ior among local governments10 implies that there must be surrogate
incentives that motivate local governments to act like profit maximiz-
ing firms in the provision of local public goods.
In a landmark article,11 Charles Tiebout explained that the behav-
ior of local governments is likely to simulate that of the profit-maxi-
mizing firm when consumer-taxpayers are able to "vote with their
feet." The intuition of Tiebout's model is that when consumer-taxpay-
ers are fully mobile (that is, when residents can move costlessly from
jurisdiction to jurisdiction), there will be strong pressures for local
government to respond to the wishes of the electorate, as expressed in
the willingness of resident citizens to pay taxes to finance public serv-
ices. Just as the consumers' freedom to purchase a product from a
competing firm induces the profit-maximizing firm to satisfy its cus-
tomers' desires, the residents' freedom to move to another juridiction
in search of a better buy for their taxing dollar induces local govern-
ment to do the same. Thus, in a Tiebout world, tax competition is
nothing more than local government acting as a profit-maximizing
firm, seeking to prevent the migration of its revenue base by providing
those goods and services that its taxpayers desire at the lowest possi-
ble price.
B. Influence of Tax Competition on Design of Local Fiscal Systems
If forced by the pressures of the mobile consumer-taxpayer to com-
pete with other taxing jurisdictions, how might tax competition influ-
ence the design of local fiscal systems? To best answer this question,
we may find it benefical to begin by considering how tax competitive
9. In his book The Wealth of Nations, Adam Smith described the benefits of compe-
tition as follows:
But it is only for the sake of profit that any man employs his capital....
he will always, therefore, endeavour to employ it in the support of that
industry of which the produce is likely to be of the greatest value, or to
exchange for the greatest quantity either of money or of other goods....
he is in this, as in many other cases, led by an invisible hand to promote
an end which was no part of his intention. Nor is it always the worse for
the society that it was no part of it. By pursuing his own interest he
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he
really intends to promote it.
J. HIRSHLEIFER, supra note 4, at 13 (quoting A. SMITH, WEALTH OF NATIONs book
IV, ch. 2 (1776)).
10. The Nebraska tax reform discussed in Part III is a case in point.
11. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416 (1956).
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
behavior might influence the design of local fiscal systems if every res-
ident were fully mobile between taxing jurisdictions,' 2 and then to
contrast this design with the design of local fiscal systems in the total
absence of tax competitive behavior, as when residents are fully im-
mobile-unable to move between taxing jurisdictions regardless of the
level of taxes they face. While full resident mobility and immobility
are obviously both unrealistic assumptions, the following analysis of
local fiscal systems under each assumption will provide invaluable
benchmarks by which to analyze the influence of tax competition on
local fiscal design in the real world.
1. Local Fiscal Design Under Full Mobility Assumption
If every resident were fully mobile between taxing jurisdictions,
the pressures of tax competition would ensure that local fiscal design
would involve nothing more than a tax on every resident to the extent
of the benefits of local governmental service received. Any attempt to
do otherwise would involve the immediate migration of those resi-
dents facing tax levels in excess of benefits received.' 3 Eventually, lo-
cal government would be forced to match resident tax levels with
benefits received, or face inevitable insolvency.14
Thus, in the presence of full resident mobility, the only workable
local taxing scheme is one based on a benefit approach, in which tax
levels correspond directly with benefits received.15 An ability-to-pay
approach to taxation16 is simply unworkable when residents are fully
mobile, for any attempt to assess taxes without regard to benefits re-
ceived would imply immediate migration of those higher income resi-
dents facing tax levels in excess of benefits received. A similar
pattern of "immigration" would be expected of those lower income
12. Our assumption of full mobility will be similar to that of Tiebout. That is, we will
assume that residents can move costlessly from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Id. at
419.
13. This result should not be hard to fathom, for if an individual faced no costs in
moving, it only makes sense that he or she would move to take advantage of the
potential tax savings. What is hard to overcome in reaching this result is the
temptation to continue to consider such intangible variables as family, climate,
and job opportunity. But, for our purposes, these too are costs of moving.
14. Once every resident whose tax levels exceeded benefits received had migrated,
the only residents left would be those that received benefits in excess of taxes
paid. This practice could obviously not continue for long before local government
would become insolvent.
15. For an excellent in-depth discussion of the benefit approach to taxation, see R.
MusGRAvE, THE THEORY OF PUBLIC FINANCE 61-89 (1959).
16. With an ability-to-pay approach to taxation, taxing officials characterize taxpay-
ers according to ability-to-pay and then assess taxes accordingly. For a more in-
depth discussion of this approach, see id. at 90-115.
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residents standing to gain from the reverse.17 With full resident mo-
bility, local governmental officials would be quick to realize that an
ability-to-pay approach to taxation represents nothing more than a
quick ticket into insolvency and quick ticket out of public office.
2. Local Fiscal Design Under Full Immobility Assumption
In contrast to the full resident mobility assumption under which
tax competition forces local fiscal design to follow strictly a benefit
approach to local taxation, the assumption of full resident immobility
renders the forces of tax competition inoperable. No longer concerned
that residents will migrate when faced with onerous levels of tax, local
government can cast benefit principles of taxation aside in favor of an
ability-to-pay approach to taxation.
An ability-to-pay approach to taxation is appealing to local officials
because this approach embodies the widely accepted principles of hori-
zontal and vertital equity.'8 Horizontal equity is the notion that simi-
larly situated taxpayers should face similar burdens of tax, and
vertical equity is the notion that a taxpayer with greater resources
should pay more taxes than a taxpayer with lesser resources.19 Under
an ability-to-pay approach to taxation, the benefits of governmental
services received are totally irrelevant. As a consequence, an ability-
to-pay approach to taxation provides for a redistributional function of
the taxing system, as those in higher income brackets invariably pay
more in taxes than they receive in benefits. An ability-to-pay ap-
proach to taxation does not necessarily have to be progressive to be
redistributive,2O but progressivity is often a characteristic of the abil-
ity-to-pay approach.21
The sharp contrast in fiscal design under the full mobility and full
immobility assumptions illustrates the tremendous impact resident
17. That is, tax levels that are below the fair market value of local governmental
services received.
18. See R. MUSGAVE, supra note 15, at 160.
19. For a more in-depth discussion of these concepts, see id.
20. That this is so should be evident by considering that even with a flat rate of tax, a
person with a higher level of income will pay more in taxes than a person with a
lower level of income.
21. The widely held belief that equality of sacrifice requires not only that the rich
pay more in taxes than the poor, but also that the rich pay a greater proportion of
his income in taxes than the poor has long served to justify the use of progressive
tax structures. J. OCHS, supra note 2, at 111-12. The basis for this widely held
belief is the assumption that income is subject to diminishing marginal utility and
that utility is commensurable among individuals. Even under these assumptions,
however, it does not necessarily follow that equality of sacrifice requires a pro-
gressive tax structure. For a simple proof of this, see id. at 112-14. Instead, "as-
sertions of the fairness of progressive tax rate structures seem to be more firmly
rooted in a preference for an equal distribution of income than in equality of
sacrifice in payment for public goods." Id. at 114.
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mobility can have in shaping the forces of tax competition. When resi-
dents are fully mobile, tax competition operates in full force, requiring
strict adherence to a benefit approach to local taxation in order to
avoid mass migration and inevitable insolvency of local government.
However, when residents are fully immobile, tax competition has no
influence whatsoever on local fiscal design. Absent the competitive
pressures that require tax levels to correspond with benefits received,
local officials are free to adopt progressive, ability-to-pay approaches
to local taxation.
Given the dramatic influence resident mobility has on local fiscal
design, the importance of understanding the factors that influence res-
ident mobility cannot be underestimated. Thus, it is to this task we
now turn.
3. Factors Influencing Resident Mobility
Recall from our earlier discussion that modem price theory as-
sumes that the incentive to maximize utility motivates individual eco-
nomic behavior, and the incentive to maximize profits motivates the
economic behavior of the firm.22 From these assumptions, it follows
logically that local taxes will impact resident mobility only when the
tax savings from migrating exceed the costs of migrating. From this
description, resident mobility can be seen as an increasing function of
local tax levels and a decreasing function of resident migration costs.
The influence of migration costs on resident mobility cannot be un-
derestimated. Family, climate, and job opportunity, not to mention
actual moving costs, are just a few of the factors that make up an indi-
vidual's migration costs. The costs of building new plants, as well as
changes in transportation, labor, and capital costs, provide similar mi-
gration costs for the firm. When all things are considered, migration
costs can be fairly substantial and can reduce significantly resident
mobility.
The presence of migration costs provides the basis on which local
government can deviate from the benefit principles of taxation. As
migration costs increase relative to local taxes, residents become less
mobile and local officials are able to adopt more progressive, ability-to-
pay approaches to taxation.
By lowering migration costs, technological advance must be recog-
nized as a time-honored promoter of tax competition. 23 Technological
advance, however, usually comes about rather slowly. As a conse-
quence, increased resident mobility from declining migration costs
would also be expected to proceed at a rather unhurried pace. But, if
22. See H. VARIAN, supra note 6, at 6, 82.
23. A good example is the increased mobility our nation has experienced as the result
of continued improvements in the means of transportation.
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migration costs change so slowly, how then did we come to witness
such a dramatic increase in tax competitive behavior among local ju-
risdictions over the last several years? The answer to this question
lies in the fact that unlike migration costs, the influence of local taxes
on resident mobility can change virtually overnight, with the swift
stroke of the policymaker's pen.
Ironically, it was federal policy revisions rather than those of the
several states that were responsible for the recent increase in in-
terjurisdictional tax competition. These federal shifts in policy in-
dude the "Fend-For-Yourself Fiscal Federalism" of the Reagan era
and the trend toward lower federal rates of tax in the 1980s. 24
With the "Fend-For-Yourself Fiscal Federalism," local government
suddenl became responsible for many governmental functions that
had previously been the responsibility of federal government. This
change, in turn, increased substantially the revenue states demanded
out of their fiscal systems. 25 Given that resident mobility is an in-
creasing function of local tax levels, as these increased revenue de-
mands forced states to raise local tax levels, more and more residents
who had previously been immobile suddenly became mobile.
Just as the "Fend-For-Yourself Fiscal Federalism" increased resi-
dent mobility, so did the trend in the 1980s toward lower federal tax
rates. Prior to the Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, the top federal
individual tax rate was 70%26 and the top corporate tax rate was
461.27 By 1988, these rates had fallen to 28%28 and 34%,29 respec-
tively, as a result of the Tax Reform Act of 1986. Given that certain
state and local taxes are deductible for federal tax purposes by individ-
uals and businesses alike,30 with the decline in federal rates, the por-
tion federal government subsidized of individual and business state
tax bills had declined by 42%31 and 12%, respectively, in just a five-
24. See Shannon, Interstate Tax Competition-The Need for a New Look, 39 NAT'L
TAX J. 339 (1986). In addition to these two policy changes, the author of this
article cited the growing vulnerability of our domestic manufacturers to foreign
competition as a factor that quickens the search for a competitive location within
the United States. Id. at 339.
25. For the 12-month period ending with June 1986, state tax collections were up
6.1%. See State and Local Tax Set Record Levels, 164 J. OF AccT. 35 (Oct. 1987).
The following year state tax collections were up again, this time by 8.3%. See
Wall Street Journal, Apr. 27,1988, at 1, col. 5. While there may be other factors at
work behind these state tax collection increases, these increases are consistent
with what we'would expect as the result of the "Fend-For-Yourself Fiscal Feder-
alism" of the Reagan era.
26. I.R.C. § 1 (1980).
27. I.R.C. § 11 (1980).
28. I.R.C. § 1 (1986).
29. I.R.C. § 11 (1986).
30. I.R.C. §§ 162, 164 (1988).
31. One of the hotly debated issues of the 1986 Tax Reform was whether or not indi-
vidual deductibility of state and local taxes ought to repealed. Had Congress re-
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year period. Once again, many residents who had previously found it
unprofitable to move would now be expected to reassess their posi-
tions as the reduction in federal rates increased substantially the bur-
den of local taxes relative to resident migration costs.
With the increase in resident mobility resulting from the "Fend-
For-Yourself Fiscal Federalism" of the Reagan era and the lower fed-
eral tax rates of the 1980s, there were renewed competitive pressures
on states to legislate tax cuts in favor of the highly mobile. In 1987,
Nebraska joined the list of its neighboring states who had been forced
by competitive pressures to rethink their taxing posture.32 In Part III,
this Comment analyzes the Nebraska Legislature's changes to Ne-
braska's individual and corporate taxing schemes in light of our theo-
retical development of tax competition's role in local fiscal design.
III. TAX COMPETITION AND NEBRASKA TAX REFORM
A. Individual Reform3 3 -Reductions in Progressivity
Individual migration costs vary inevitably from individual to indi-
vidual. The different costs each individual assigns to an almost unlim-
ited number of variables that affect migration account for these
variances. The many different variables affecting migration include
such things as job and family ties, income, and climate preferences,
just to name a few. Given the wide variation in migration costs, it is
safe to assume that resident mobility also varies widely from individ-
ual to individual. But, assuming migration costs on the whole are not
significantly different from one income group to the next, in jurisdic-
tions with progressive taxing schemes, higher income residents are
likely to be significantly more mobile than lower income residents.
This result follows logically from the fact that in progressive taxing
pealed this deduction, the percentage decline would have been the full 70%. Not
surprisingly, one the issues as to whether individual state and local taxes ought to
remain deductible was whether the increase in tax competition that would have
resulted was desirable or not. For an excellent discussion of this, see Break, Tax
Competition and Federal Tax Deductibility, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 349 (1986); McClure,
Tax Competition: Is What's Good for the Private Goose also Good for the Public
Gander?, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 341 (1986); and Wildasin, Interstate Tax Competition"
A Comment, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 353 (1986).
32. This list includes Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, and Colorado who "all have incentive
programs designed to encourage taxpayers to locate within their boundaries."
Cederberg & Kuhn, Nebraska Tax and Economic Reform; An Innovative Change,
21 CREIGHTON L. REv. 475, 482 n.28 (1988).
33. L.B. 773 embodies the majority of the changes the Nebraska Legislature made to
the Nebraska individual income tax. L.B. 773, Neb. Unicameral, 90th Leg., 1st
Sess., 1987 Neb. Laws 17113 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-2701,
-2701.01, -2714 to -2715.01, -2716, -2724, -2725, -2729, -2730, -2732, -2733, -2734.01,
-2734.02, -2734.04, -2753, -2765, 2775, -2781, -2786, -2793, -27,119.01 (Supp. 1987)).
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systems, higher income individuals face the greatest discrepancies be-
tween taxes paid and local governmental services received.
Under our assumption that individual economic behavior is moti-
vated by the incentive to maximize utility,34 individual residents
would be expected to become mobile when they can reduce discrepan-
cies between taxes paid and local governmental services received by
an amount that exceeds their particular migration costs. Since higher
income individuals face the greatest discrepancies as a result of pro-
gressive taxing systems, absolute reductions in these discrepancies
from migrating are likely to be much greater for the higher income
individual.
The "Fend-For-Yourself Fiscal Federalism" of the Reagan era and
the lower federal tax rates of the 1980s dramatically increased the mo-
bility of the higher income resident by exacerbating the discrepancies
between taxes paid and local governmental services received. As a
consequence, many states were forced to legislate tax cuts in favor of
higher income individuals to eliminate the locational disincentives of
what had become overly progressive taxing schemes. The Nebraska
response to the forces of tax competition was no exception.
Nebraska is somewhat unique in that by virtue of its ties with the
federal taxing system,3 5 the progressivity of Nebraska's taxing scheme
had already dramatically declined as a result of the Federal Tax Re-
form Act of 1986, from a top marginal rate prior to reform of 10.5% to
a post-reform rate of 5.9%.36 In its reform of the individual income
tax, however, the Nebraska Legislature left the top tax marginal rate
unchanged at 5.9%,37 and replaced the revenue shortfall by dramati-
cally increasing the share of revenue it collected on taxable incomes
below $30,000.38 The Nebraska Legislature's conscious decision not to
34. See H. VARIAN, supra note 6.
35. Many states were tied to the federal tax system in the sense that many states'
income tax computations began with federal adjusted gross income. What makes
Nebraska's ties with the federal tax system unique is that Nebraska is one of only
a few states that began its income tax computation with the amount of federal
tax.
36. These two figures are based on a pre-1986 federal tax reform top marginal rate of
50%, and a post-reform top marginal rate of 28%, in conjunction with a 21% Ne-
braska tax rate on the resulting federal tax liability. Thus, 50% x 21% = 10.5%
and 28% x 21% = 5.9%.
37. L.B. 773, Neb. Unicameral, 90th Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Neb. Laws 1713 (codified as
amended at NEB. Rzv. STAT. § 77-2701.01 (Supp. 1987)). This section sets forth
what is known as a primary rate. For tax years beginning after December 31,
1986, the primary rate is 3.15%. Id. In addition, this section sets forth five indi-
vidual tax brackets (A - E) that provide for another tax rate that is to be used in
conjunction with the primary rate in computing an overall effective rate of tax.
Bracket E, which is the top bracket, provides that individuals in this bracket com-
pute their tax liability based on a rate that is 187% of the primary rate. Thus, the
top marginal rate has remained unchanged at 5.9% (187% x 3.15% = 5.9%).
38. On this point, see Cederberg & Kuhn, supra note 32, at 484.
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reverse the dramatic reduction in progressivity caused by federal tax
reform should come as no surprise, for this response is exactly what
we would expect from local officials under competitive pressure to al-
leviate the locational disincentives of an overly progressive individual
income tax.39
B. Corporate Tax Reform 4 O-Tax Discrimination
With individuals, we assumed that migration costs did not vary sig-
nificantly from one income group to the next. With businesses, how-
ever, there are industries whose firms are inherently less mobile than
firms in other industries. There is no exhaustive list of industries
whose firms can be characterized as being inherently immobile, but as
a practical matter, we usually conceive of the firms within the retail,
construction, utility, and personal service industries as being inher-
ently immobile, because firms within these industries have no choice
but to locate where their market is.41 Similarly, there are industries
that by the nature of their operation are heavily operated toward the
source of their raw materials and thus, can also be characterized as
being inherently immobile.42
The presence of immobile business is significant in that it provides
incentives for local officials to bifurcate their business taxing schemes.
Cognizant that immobile business cannot escape onerous levels of tax,
local taxing officials are in a position to engage in a practice of tax
discrimination against immobile business. In reforming its corporate
business tax, the Nebraska Legislature did just that.
Through an assortment of tax incentives, 43 the Nebraska Legisla-
39. The authors of the article on Nebraska Tax Reform noted that "[t]he Nebraska
individual income tax rates before 1987 were more progressive than the income
tax rates of any neighboring state." Id. at 483.
40. This discussion focuses on the changes to the corporate income tax that the
Nebraska Legislature made in The Employment and Investment Growth Act of
1987, L.B.775, Neb. Unicameral, 90th Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Neb. Laws 1742 (codified
as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-202, -2701, -2708, -2734.05 (Cum. Supp.
1987)), and The Employment Expansion and Investment Incentive Act of 1987,
L.B. 270, Neb. Unicameral, 90th Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Neb. Laws 646 (codified as
amended at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-27,187 to -27,191, -27,193 (Cum. Supp. 1987)).
41. For a more detailed discussion of these particular businesses, see Papke & Papke,
Measuring Differential State-Local Tax Liabilities and their Implications for
Business Investment Location, 39 NAT'L TAX J. 357, 358-59 (1986).
42. Id. at 359.
43. For example, the Employment and Investment Growth Act of 1987, L.B. 775,
Neb. Unicameral, 90th Leg., 1st Sess., 1987 Neb. Laws 1742 (codified as amended
at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 77-202, -2701, -2708, -2734.05 (Cum. Supp. 1987)), provided
qualifying businesses with investment tax credits, id. § 77-4105(4)(b), jobs tax
credits, id. § 77-4105(4)(a), sales tax refunds, id. § 77-4105(3), sales only allocation
factors, id. § 77-4105(1), and personal property tax relief, id. § 77-4105(2). For an
excellent discussion of the tax incentives provided by L.B. 775 as well as L.B. 270,
see Cederberg & Kuhn, supra note 32, at 490-502.
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ture provided significant reductions in the effective tax costs of certain
qualifying businesses. To be a qualifying business under L.B. 775, a
business must be engaged in one of the following activities:
(1) Research development or testing for scientific, agricultural, food
product, or industrial purposes;
(2) Data processing, telecommunications, insurance, or financial
services;
(3) Manufacturing, assembly, or fabrication of tangible personal
property;
(4) Administrative management or headquarter facilities;
(5) Any combination of the above businesses;
(6) Storage, warehousing, distribution, transportation, or sale of tan-
gible personal property.4 4
Similarly, the following is a list of qualifying businesses eligible for
the credits under L.B. 270:
(1) The assembly, fabrication, manufacture, or processing of tangible
personal property;
(2) The feeding or raising of livestock;
(3) The storage, warehousing, distribution, transportation, or sale of
tangible personal property;
(4) The performance of data processing telecommunications, insur-
ance, or financial services;
(5) The administrative management of any of the above activities.45
Noticeably absent from the list of qualifying business are those in-
herently immobile businesses such as the retail, construction, and util-
ities industries referred to above. Once again, though, the Nebraska
response should come as no surprise, for tax competition provides lo-
cal officials with no incentive to make tax cuts in favor of an immobile
business population. That Iowa might tax its retail trade at a lower
effective rate than Nebraska should be of no concern to Nebraska, for
Nebraska retailers have no choice but to remain where their market
is. Thus, the Nebraska response is exactly as we might expect, a bifur-
cated business tax, discriminating in favor of a highly mobile business
base.
Until now, this Comment has focused on the theory of tax competi-
tion, and how tax competition influences local fiscal design, both in
theory and in practice. In Part IV our emphasis shifts to an analysis of
the economic consequences of the tax competitive behavior that has
swept local government. This economic analysis focuses primarily on
issues of equity and efficiency.
44. NEB. REV. STAT. § 77-4103(11) (Cum. Supp. 1988).
45. Id. § 77-27,189.
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IV. ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF TAX COMPETITION
To engage in any meaningful discussion of the economic conse-
quences of tax competition, we must have standards by which to eval-
uate the tax competitive behavior we witness on the part of local
government. For purposes of Part IV, the terms "efficiency" and "eq-
uity" will serve as these standards. "Efficiency" refers to the relation-
ship between the aggregate benefits and the aggregate costs of a
particular situation, and "equity" refers to the distribution of income
among individuals.46 In simpler terms, efficiency corresponds to the
size of the pie, and equity to how the pie is sliced.47
A. Efficiency Gains from Tax Competition
1. More Optimal Provision of Local Public Goods
A traditional function of government is to provide those goods that
people desire, but because of various defects in the market, are either
not provided or are inadequately provided by the market.48 Econo-
mists refer to these particular goods as public goods. "[A] public good
is one which should be produced, but for which there is no feasible
method of charging the consumers."49 Our system of national defense
provides an illustrative example of a public good. Because of the
unique nature of national defense, there is no feasible method for pri-
vate enterprise to charge the consumer for this good. If an individual
consumer bought this good in the market for himself, every other con-
sumer would be able to enjoy the benefits of a system of national de-
fense free of charge. With goods like national defense, consumers
have the incentive to understate their true preferences for the good in
the hope that they can get a free ride from the provision of the good by
others.50 As a result of this strategic behavior, the market presumes
that there is not a sufficient demand for these goods, and the market
inadequately provides public goods like national defense. A tradi-
tional function of government, then, is to try and ascertain society's
true preferences for public goods that have been purposely under-
stated in the market, and see that the provision of these public goods is
consistent with society's true preferences. But, in the absence of a
46. As to these definitions of "efficiency" and "equity," see A. POLINSKY, AN INTRO-
DUCTION TO LAW AND ECONoMics 7 (1983).
47. Id. at 7.
48. For a more in-depth discussion of this traditional function of government and the
various defects giving rise to the need for such a function, see J. OcHs, supra note
2, at 1-31.
49. Tiebout, supra note 11, at 417.
50. When consumers are able to get a free ride from the provision of a good by others,
economists refer to this as the free-rider problem. For a more in-depth discussion
of the free-rider problem and the related problem of externalities, see J. OCas,
supra note 2, at 27-30.
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properly functioning price system, how is the government to ascertain
society's true preferences for public goods?
The genius of Tiebout's article5 ' is that when residents are fully
mobile between taxing jurisdictions, tax competition forces local gov-
ernment to ascertain people's preferences for public goods, based on
residents' willingness to pay taxes to finance local public services.
Just as profit and survival incentives force private firms to monitor
closely consumers' preferences for private goods, the threat of mass
migration and inevitable bankruptcy forces local officials to similarly
monitor the public's preferences for public goods and to provide those
goods that the public desires at the lowest possible tax price.
Thus, one obvious benefit of tax competition is that it ensures a
more efficient provision of local public goods. Just how far tax compe-
tition can push local jurisdictions towards the optimal provision of lo-
cal public goods is obviously a function of resident mobility. The
optimal provision of local public goods would undoubtedly never be
reached, for it is inconceivable that residents could ever move
costlessly between taxing jurisdictions. In addition, there are at least
two strands of literature that suggest that even in the presence of full
mobility, local government may not provide an optimal basket of local
public goods.52 The fact that tax competition may not result in the
optimal provision of local public goods, however, should not under-
mine the fact that tax competition can still move local government
toward a "more optimal" provision of local public goods, albeit not
"the optimal."
51. Tiebout, supra note 11, at 416.
52. The first strand of literature suggests that there will be an underprovision of
those public goods whose benefits spill over to the residents of other taxing juris-
dictions. The intuition of this argument is that these particular goods will be
underprovided because local officials fail to account for the additional benefits
that spill over to residents in other jurisdictions in ascertaining the optimal level
that should be provided to the public. As to this strand of literature, see Brainard
& Dolbear, The Possibility of Oversupply of Local Public Goods, 89 J. POL. ECON.
1197 (1981); Williams, The Optimal Provision of Public Goods in a System of Lo-
cal Government, 74 J. POL. ECON. 18 (1966).
The second strand of literature suggests the provision of local public goods
will be suboptimal because of the fiscal externality residents create in moving.
This fiscal externality results because the migrating resident fails to take into
account the effect of his moving on the tax price of local public goods in the re-
gion he leaves as well as in the region he enters. As to this strand of literature,
see Buchanan & Goetz, Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of
the Tiebout Model, 1 J. POL. ECON. 25 (1972); Flatters, Henderson & Mieszkowski,
Public Goods, Efjfciency, and Regions Fiscal Equalization, 3 J. POL. ECON. 99
(1974); Stiglitz, The Theory of Local Public Goods Twenty-Five Years after Tie-
bout- A Perspective, in LOCAL PROVISION OF PUBLIC SERVICES: THE TIEBOuT
MODEL AFTER TwENTY-FIVE YEARS 17 (G. Zodrow ed. 1983).
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2. Elimination of the Leviathan Problem
In the theory of the firm, the assumption that the incentive to
maximize profits motivates the economic behavior of the firm53
breaks down when the firm is operating in something less than a
purely competitive market, and firm management and firm ownership
are not vested in the same people. In these circumstances, firm man-
agers, as maximizers of their own utility, have incentives to use firm
resources to satisfy other more personal interests, instead using firm
resources to maximize profits for some absentee group of owners. 54
In government, this type of behavior is referred to as the Leviathan
problem.5 5 Government, if for the people, is inevitably not-for-profit,
and to the extent there is no competition from governments in other
jurisdictions, the environment in which most governments operate is
ripe for exploitation. In this environment, "[m]aintenance of employ-
ment, salary, and 'perks' and freedom from the rigors of cost-minimiz-
ing efficiency may be a large part of the agenda, as in the case of
employees in non-competitive parts of the private sector."5 6
Another beneficial consequence of tax competition, then, is that it
operates to remove one of the necessary conditions for the existence of
the Leviathan problem, which is government operating in a noncom-
petitive environment. In competitive markets, the very survival of the
firm and government hinge on pursuing profit-maximizing behavior.
Anything less on the part of government would mean that residents
could get a better bargain for their taxing dollar by migrating else-
where. Thus, tax competition serves to ensure that government seeks
to serve the people and not itself.57
3. Redistribution Function Confined to Federal Government
In the theory of public finance, the most efficient assignment of the
redistributive function of government is at the highest level of govern-
53. See supra note 8.
54. In their famous book, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
(1932), Adolf A. Berle and Gardiner C. Means first recognized that as stock own-
ership became increasingly diffused, corporate managers would become less sub-
ject to the control of corporate shareholders and more free to manage the
corporation in their own self-interests. For some empirical evidence in support of
Berle's and Mean's proposition, see Williamson, Managerial Discretion and Busi-
ness Behavior, 53 AM. ECON. REV. 1032 (1963).
55. For some empirical evidence that casts doubt on the Leviathan hypothesis, see
Oates, Searching for Leviathan: An Empirical Study, 75 Am. ECON. REv. 748
(1985).
56. McClure, supra note 31, at 345.
57. George Break described the beneficial consequences of tax competition as fol-
lows: "[lt replaces sloth and inertia with an active search for better and more
varied public services and for more efficient ways of providing them." G. BREAK,
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FIscAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 178 (1967).
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ment.58 Musgrave reasons that if both state and central government
insist on a particular distribution of income, a final solution would
never be feasible.
It would lead to a continuous set of adjustments and readjustment without a
final equilibrium being reached. Since one or the other level of government
must be given priority, there is much to be said, in the federal system, for
permitting this adjustment to be made at the central level. Unless this is
done, distributional adjustments at the state level may come to be nullified by
interstate movement, and serious barriers to an optimal location of economic
activity may be imposed.5 9
Nevertheless, a progressive, ability-to-pay approach to taxation is
appealing to local officials because this approach allows local officials
to achieve both horizontal and vertical equity in their taxing
schemes.6 0 As pressures from tax competition increase, however, lo-
cal officials become more and more cognizant of residents migrating to
escape the onerous levels of tax that often characterize this approach
to local taxation. As a result, sources of revenue for many of local
government's redistributive services begin to dry up. Ultimately, if
the forces of tax competition are sufficiently strong, local government
will be forced to abandon its efforts to effectuate a redistributive func-
tion of local government, and the responsibility for this function of
government will fall solely on the shoulders of federal government.
The irony of the fact that the forces of tax competition require the
redistributive function to be confined to the federal level of govern-
ment is that this is just as the theory of public finance would have it,
given the efficiencies of having the highest level of government redis-
tribute wealth. Thus, a collateral benefit of tax competition is that it
serves to ensure an efficient assignment of the redistributive function
of government.
B. Detrimental Consequences of Tax Competition
1. Underprovision of Local Public Goods
Many economists argue that a detrimental side effect of tax compe-
tition is that it results in "a tendency toward less than efficient levels
of output of local public services. In an attempt to keep tax rates low
to attract business investment, local officials may hold spending below
those levels for which marginal benefits equal marginal costs."61 In
other words, tax competition in the eyes of many is nothing more than
58. See, eg., RM MUSGRAVE, supra note 15, at 181.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 160.
61. W. OATEs, supra note 1, at 143. David Wildasin also subscribes to this view and
advocates federal subsidies to states of up to 40% to offset this tendency for an
underprovision of public goods at the local level. See Wildasin, supra note 31, at
354.
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
a "zero sum game" or a "beggar thy neighbor" type activity.62 In re-
sponse to these criticisms, Charles McClure states that "if benefits for
residents of the taxing jurisdiction must be financed by taxes on capi-
tal that is mobile between jurisdictions ..... [t]hat spending should be
suboptimal under these circumstances is hardly surprising."63
In an illuminating example, McClure asks "whether spending on
school lunches in Gloucester, Massachusetts would be optimal if fi-
nanced entirely by a property tax on the fishing fleet docked there."64
He submits that:
[M]ost of us would agree that competition from neighboring harbors (in the
markets for both fish and dock facilities) would prevent the cost of school
lunches from being borne by either consumers of fish or... owners of boats.
Rather, one would expect that boats would be docked elsewhere, little reve-
nue would be collected by Gloucester, the burden of the tax would be borne by
owners of the least mobile factors in Gloucester, and school lunches would be
supplied at sub-optimal levels in Gloucester.65
McClure's example illustrates that often the underprovision of local
public goods is more the result of second-best approaches to the fi-
nancing of these goods than the consequence of tax competition.6 6
2. Efficiency Distortions of Tax Competition
While the problem with tax competition is that it does not neces-
sarily cause underspending in the public sector, it can potentially re-
sult in tax distortions that detract from economic efficiency. Because
states and localities are hesitant to tax mobile residents for fear of
driving them away, "they may... be induced to use socially less effi-
cient taxes-perhaps taxes on labor, or on specific commodities."6 7
The efficiency of any tax is measured by considering the extent to
which that tax distorts economic activity. If a residential property tax,
for example, drives out residential capital at the margin, then it is an
inefficient tax. While it is impossible to design a taxing scheme that
does not distort economic activity to some extent, the most efficient
taxing scheme would be one that raised the desired level of revenue
with the least distortion of economic activity. If, for example, our resi-
dential property tax drove out more residential capital at the margin
than say a tax on business capital, then a taxing scheme that relied
more heavily on a business capital tax would be more efficient than a
62. John Shannon states that until quite recently this rather dim view of intergov-
ernmental tax competition was widely held by students of public policy. See
Shannon, supra note 24.
63. McClure, supra note 31, at 341-42.
64. Id. at 342.
65. Id.
66. McClure adds that in this case "[t]he first-best solution from an allocative point of
view would be to charge market price for the lunches, rather than trying to cover
their cost through the taxation of an entirely different and mobile activity." Id.
67. Wildasin, supra note 31, at 353-54.
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taxing scheme that relied more heavily on a residential capital tax, for
there would be less distortion of economic activity with the former.
Thus, the optimal taxation scheme, at least from an efficiency stand-
point, would be to tax most heavily those classes of property with the
most inelastic demand.68
With tax competition, a tax on mobile residents does not necessar-
ily drive out economic activity at the margin, it just drives it else-
where. Thus, in McClure's example, the property tax on the fishing
fleet in Gloucester, Massachusetts does not necessarily drive out capi-
tal for fishing fleets, the fishing fleets just show up in another harbor.
The problem with tax competition is that if a tax on capital for fishing
fleets distorts economic activity less than a tax on retail capital, then
the fact that tax competition prevents local officials from taxing the
mobile fishing fleet capital more heavily than immobile retail capital
means that tax competition can cause local officials to rely on ineffi-
cient schemes of local taxation.
While in theory tax competition may prevent local officials from
adopting efficient schemes of local taxation, an interesting sidelight in
practice is that even in the absence of tax competition, equitable and
not necessarily efficient schemes of local taxation are often the most
popular choice.69
3. Inequitable Schemes of Local Taxation
That local officials would choose to promote equity over efficiency
in the absence of competition implies that another detrimental conse-
quence of tax competition may be that it results in potentially inequi-
table schemes of local taxation. As noted, equity manifests itself in
local schemes of taxation in approaches that levy taxes according to
ability to pay.70 By taxing similarly situated taxpayers similarly, an
ability-to-pay approach promotes horizontal equity, and by levying
greater burdens on those with a greater ability to pay, an ability-to-pay
approach promotes vertical equity as well.
In the presence of tax competition, local officials can be forced to
abandon these equitable ability-to-pay approaches to taxation in favor
of a benefit approach that ties tax levels more closely with benefits
received. Of course, how far tax competition forces local officials to
deviate from an ability-to-pay approach depends on resident mobility.
68. As to this optimal approach to taxation, see Beck, Tax Competition, Uniform As-
sessment and the Benefit Principle, 13 J. URB. ECON. 127 (1983).
69. See supra notes 4-32 and accompanying text. In the absence of competitive pres-
sures that force local officials to tie tax levels with benefit received, local officials
opt for more progressive, ability-to-pay approaches to taxation in an attempt to
promote both horizontal and vertical equity. For a more in-depth discussion of
this situation, see R. MuSGRAVE, supra note 15, at 160.
70. R. MUSGRAvE, supm note 15, at 160.
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In the extreme case of full resident mobility, tax levels would have to
correspond exactly with benefits received. In this situation, a very,
very wealthy individual could conceivably pay the same or even less in
taxes than the very poor individual. The more realistic case, however,
might be as in Nebraska where immobile business is taxed more heav-
ily than mobile business. But, just the same, tax competition has
caused a breakdown in the ability-to-pay approach at the local level,
and two similarly situated Nebraska corporations may well face differ-
ent burdens of tax.71
V. CONCLUSION
Whether the equity loss from tax competition outweighs the effi-
ciency gain is a normative issue whose resolution lies beyond the scope
of this Comment.72 Nevertheless, the fact that this Comment does not
attempt to resolve this normative issue should not detract from the
thrust of this Comment, which was to provide a positive economic
analysis of tax competition. We laid the foundation for this analysis
by examining the theoretical underpinnings of tax competition, and
expanded on this examination with an in-depth look at how tax com-
petition influences local fiscal design, in theory as well as in practice.
From there, we developed a framework by which to analyze the posi-
tive economic consequences of tax competition. In that development,
we saw that tax competition serves to promote economic efficiency by
driving local government toward a more optimal provision of public
goods, by eliminating the Leviathan problem, and by ensuring that the
redistributional function of government is assigned at the highest
level of government. However, we also saw that tax competition was
potentially inefficient in that it induces local officials to adopt less
than efficient schemes of local taxation. And, finally, we saw that tax
competition could potentially result in economic inequities by forcing
states to abandon their progressive, ability-to-pay approaches to
taxation.
Given the size of present day government, the importance of un-
derstanding the interdependancies of local government cannot be un-
derestimated. In response to these concerns, this Comment was
written in an attempt to provide a higher level of understanding of the
intricacies of interjurisdictional tax competition. In so doing, hope-
71. The most popular response to the objection to tax competition on distributional
grounds is that redistributive policies should be confined to the federal govern-
ment in the first place since that is where these policies can be most efficiently
carried out. On this point, see supra Part IV, section three of this Comment, and
McClure, supra note 31, at 346.
72. McClure concluded that this normative issue balances out and that "the benefits
of tax competition are potentially quite important" and "that tax competition is,
on balance, good." McClure, supra note 31, at 346.
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fully this Comment will stimulate further research and a broader un-
derstanding of this important phenomena of our local public
economies.
Timothy Brown '89

